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I've had to use my phone since my camera got nicked. The constraints of a tiny image size can be liberating. These are mostly of the Colne estuary, which I walk along regularly. Actually the dog is here too.
- pictures filched from http://mathworld.wolfram.com/LogNormalDistribution.html
Why? I am sure there are many extant answers to this question. My guess, keeping with the Darwinian theme, is that overachievers tend both to hang out with each other, and to compete with each other for income (or various correlates of income). This makes for a "long tail" distribution, with the mobile phone salespersons, the city slickers, and Bill Gates at the very, very top.
It's 2 am. On the world service: "Reporting Religion".
First up, two rabbis discuss the meaning of Zionism. One of them believes that compromise over the status of Jerusalem is impossible, because the Jewish people have a contract with God.
Next: Delhi is being overrun by monkeys, who have been e.g. attacking children. The monkeys cannot be harmed because they are sacred, in fact divine.
And finally, does the Koran contain truths only recently discovered by Western science? A columnist in an Egyptian newspaper thinks so, and has a page of scriptural reinterpretation every week.
The traditional response to idiocies of this kind has been something like "religion and science deal with different, incommensurable kinds of truth". Here's an alternative way to look at it. All the three ideas above involve empirical claims, which are more or less testable... and completely preposterous. Monkey Gods, contracts between God and his "chosen people", quantum physics hidden in the Koran code: what serious person can regard these ideas with anything but contempt?
There are some complex explanations of the "revenge of God", the resurgence of religion over the past fifty years. Here's a simple one, which I'm sure cannot be the whole truth: enlightened, thoughtful people took their eye off the ball. The others got so angry when we disputed their stories, that it became easier just to go along and to pretend that there was no fact of the matter in these areas. So the nutters grew louder, more confident and madder than ever. Now we should learn our lesson. When someone talks nonsense, we should stand up and call it nonsense to its face.
I've just read Virginia Woolf's A Room of One's Own for the first time. What an astonishing book. It's only about a hundred pages long, but like one of those pop-up birthday cards, it unfolds to reveal a very intricate architecture, containing in miniature almost the whole programme of feminism from that day to this: anger at inequalities of power, wealth and privilege, and examination of their roots; a call for a women's history; a sceptical focus on men's “knowledge” of women; mistrust of simple ideas about the sexes; interest in relations among women where men stop being the focus. As if she just knew! The book – it was originally meant for a lecture to undergraduate's at the women's colleges of Girton and Newnham – is full of casual asides as to how a student might profitably look at, say, the domestic history of the Elizabethan household, or the psychology of women's art.
The idea that culture has material foundations, that you need a room of your own and five hundred pounds a year to be a poet, is a Bloomsbury theme, it comes out in Howards' End too. The Bloomsbury people's intellectual elitism and passionate love for higher things combined with this intense awareness to make them more egalitarian, funnily enough. If you think pushpin is just as good as poetry then the fact that some people are poor and others rich doesn't really matter much, especially as everybody is getting richer together. But if you think Art and Beauty and above all good Conversation are the most important things in the world, then it matters terribly. (So I suppose that the Blair government's artistic policy of “access” is another way in which the powerless little clique has conquered the world.)
Did they conquer the world? If you could trace back the lineage of the spiky-haired gothic brats in Camden Town, and the elegant loft-dwellers of Manhattan or Hoxton, and the pot-smoking first-homers in small towns everywhere – of everything alternative or bohemian or unconventional, which by now includes almost everything in contemporary culture, would you find the little Cambridge gang of lesbians and nutters? I would like to think so.
Here are two quotes which make me very happy.
Meanwhile the wineglasses had flushed yellow and flushed crimson; had been emptied; had been filled. And thus by degrees was lit, halfway down the spine, which is the seat of the soul, not that hard little electric light which we call brilliance, as it pops in and out upon our lips, but the more profound, subtle and subterranean glow which is the rich yellow flame of rational intercourse. No need to hurry. No need to sparkle. No need to be anyone but oneself.
So long as you write what you wish to write, that is all that matters; and whether it matters for ages or only for hours, nobody can say. But to sacrifice a hair of the head of your vision, a shade of its colour, in deference to some Headmaster with a silver pot in his hand or to some professor with a measuring-rod up his sleeve, is the most abject treachery, and the sacrifice of wealth and chastity which used to be said the greatest of human disasters, a mere flea-bite in comparison.
Reading books like this could be a very bad idea. After spending a few hours with Virginia Woolf, you may not want to spend time with anyone else, and you may not care about anyone else's good opinion. Then you will be cursed with the worm that dyeth not, of permanent dissatisfaction, because there aren't many people like that in the world.
But she's wrong about the silver pot. The trick is to want praise and commendation from the right people.
(The context is a discussion of cues and heuristics in voting - ie how voters can make decisions without being hugely knowledgeable about politics. But I think this is interesting anyway. It is partly inspired by the economics literature on "informational cascades". This is just a very simple example.)
If I trust that you know better than me how to vote, I may vote correctly. But I am certainly not helping make the democratic majority decision any more accurate. Under certain conditions, I may even make it less accurate.
Here's a simple formal example. Suppose that there are three voters on a simple Yes-No issue. One of these outcomes is unequivocally the right one. The voters each receive some information (a signal) about whether Yes or No is the right outcome. The accuracy of those signals varies: the voters have probabilities 0.7, 0.75 and 0.8 respectively of getting accurate information which suggests they should vote in the correct way. Also, these probabilities are known to all the voters in common, although the signals themselves are private. Suppose that the voters vote independently, and try to vote the right way. They all then follow their signals, which are more likely to be right than wrong. The chance of a correct decision is the chance of all three voting right, plus the probability of three different majorities of two voting correctly: 0.7*0.75*0.8 + 0.3*0.75*0.8 + 0.7*0.25*0.8 + 0.7*0.75*0.2 = 0.845.
Now suppose that the best informed voter, Mrs Point Eight, announces what her signal is (which way her information points) before the vote. The other two voters are then each in one of two situations. Either their signal agrees with Mrs Point Eight: if so they vote the same way anyway. Or their signal disagrees. If so, they now have two conflicting signals. But Mrs Point Eight's signal is more accurate than theirs, so they sensibly choose to ignore their own signal. In either case, they vote with Mrs Point Eight. Unfortunately, this means that the chance of reaching a correct decision has gone down to 0.8.1 By trusting a better-informed person, the individual voters have become more accurate (their chance of being right is 0.8 instead of 0.7 or 0.6) but have made the collective outcome less accurate.
If you have the Firefox web browser, and regularly use Google Scholar, then check out this wonderful little bit of tech. It basically adds a "saved searches" box to Google scholar, which lets you see if new articles have been added. Very useful for monitoring research. You'll need the Greasemonkey extension for Firefox. I love this idea of consumers customizing web pages.
Then maybe you should read this red hot little number. (Just something I'm looking at at the moment. No, really, you do not have any reason to read this document.)
Game theory of killer initiatives and legislative responses to initiatives
(Just something I jotted down - a sample of the kind of work I do.)
A common institution in the context of direct legislation is to allow the legislature to respond to a proposed initiative. I put forward a game-theoretic rationale for having this institution, but point out some potential problems. The problems also apply to cases where interest groups outside the legislature sponsor “killer initiatives” which are drafted so as to affect other initiatives on the ballot box.
The rationale is as follows. We consider policy on a single dimension. The status quo is SQ and voter median ideal point is at MV. All utility functions are given by distance:
utility = |outcome – ideal point|
We assume that proposing an initiative costs C, and that the potential proposer is extreme, with ideal point marked PIP. MV' marks the point [MV + (MV -SQ)], i.e. the median voter is indifferent between MV' and SQ. To simplify, we assume that indifferent voters vote “yes” on all proposals.
SQ--------------MV-------------MV'----------------PIP--------
If the legislature may not respond to the initiative, and if MV' – SQ > C, then the proposer proposes an initiative at MV', which the voters accept. Policy is now as far from the median voter as it was before, but in the opposite direction.
Now suppose that the legislature can respond to proposed initiatives by bringing forward its own counter-proposal. If it does so, then the counter-proposal, rather than the status quo, will be the result if the ballot proposal fails. The legislature incurs no cost in bringing forward a counter-proposal: this seems reasonable, as it has no signature requirement to fulfil. Most likely the legislature's ideal point LIP will be at SQ: however, we consider all alternatives.
SQ--------LIP-----MV-------------Mv'----------------PIP--------
If LIP < MV: any proposal to the right of MV can be countered by a proposal to the left of MV, but closer to MV. Therefore, if MV – SQ > C, the proposer proposes MV; otherwise the proposer does nothing.
If MV' > LIP > MV, any proposal to the right of LIP will be met by a counter-proposal at LIP. Therefore, if LIP – SQ > C, the proposer proposes LIP; otherwise the proposer does nothing.
If PIP > LIP > MV' (ie legislature and proposer are both extreme), and if LIP – SQ > C, again the proposer proposes LIP or any proposal to the right. The legislature then responds with LIP and offers the public the unappealing choice between two proposals which are both less preferred to the median voter than the status quo. The result is LIP.
If LIP > PIP > MV' then proposer proposes PIP and legislature responds with PIP or any proposal to the right; here again, proposer and legislature collude to offer the public a Hobson's choice. The result is PIP.
In the latter two cases, a rule like the one outlined makes outcomes worse from the point of view of the median voter and the associated majority in his or her lea. However, these seem rather implausible: why shouldn't the legislature legislate directly, rather than take the roundabout initiative route? In the more plausible first two cases, the result is always better for the median voter. Allowing legislative counter-proposals essentially turns the contest into a classic Downsian two-horse race.
Potential problems
The institution as proposed above is rather simple. However, it doesn't always work like that. Switzerland allows the legislature to bring forward proposals in response to an initiative, but rather than replacing the status quo, they are voted on separately. If both the original initiative and the legislature's response pass, the legislature's proposal overrides the original initiative. (I think. Hey, this is a blog entry.) In a less institutionalised, but broadly similar way, “killer initiatives” are sometimes seen in the US. These are drafted so as to override the effect of another proposed initiative: again, if both pass, the killer initiative will specify limitations to the effects of its target.
We can model both these situations similarly, as proposers 1 and 2 decide in turn to propose initiatives. If both proposers introduce initiatives which pass, we assume that 2's proposal is implemented, as it contains clauses designed to nullify the effect of 1's proposal.
The choice situation facing the voter now becomes complicated and may require sophisticated voting – something that, it is often believed, voters in a direct democracy find difficult (e.g. Lacy and Niou 2000). That paper points out a similar result when preferences over two initiatives are non-separable. In this case, preferences over outcomes are single-peaked and the space of outcomes is one-dimensional: the problems arise because voters don't know what the effect of their vote will be. As an example, consider the following choice situation where two initiatives have been proposed:
---SQ--------------P2-------------P1---
Given single-peakedness, there are four possible preference profiles for voters:
SQ > P2 > P1
P1 > P2 > SQ
P2 > SQ > P1
P2 > P1 > SQ
The last two groups of voters have no problem: they can vote yes on P2, and yes or no on P1. A voter who happened to be decisive on either outcome could not possibly experience regret, as they would always have brought about an outcome which they preferred to the alternative – either by achieving the best possible result, P2, or by preventing P1 from supplanting the status quo, or by possibly allowing P1 to win (assuming P2 was not implemented).
The “extremists” in the first two groups are not so lucky. Consider first those who wish to preserve the status quo. A voter (or group of voters) who happens to be decisive on P2 faces the following set of choices:
P1 outcome | Vote | Result |
Passes | Yes | P1 and P2 pass: outcome P2 |
| No | P1 passes: outcome P1 |
Fails | Yes | P2 passes: outcome P2 |
| No | neither pass: outcome SQ |
Clearly, if P1 is going to fail, it's better to vote no on P2 and preserve the status quo. Equally, if P1 will pass, you should vote for P2 in order to salvage something.
Partisans of P1 face a similar problem. They should vote for P2 if P1 is going to fail, but against P2 if P1 is going to pass. The problem in terms of votes is analogous to that mentioned in Lacy and Niou (2000). For example, a member of the first preference group has the following preference ordering for outcomes of the votes:
P1 | P2 | Result | Ranking |
N | N | SQ | 1 |
N | Y | P2 | 2= |
Y | Y | P2 | 2= |
Y | N | P1 | 3 |
Thus, despite single-peakedness over the actual issue, we end up with non-separable preferences over the outcomes of votes.
These are for myself but also public.
R project for statistical computing, in case you didn't know.
Adding a straight regression line to a plot
model = lm(y ~ x)
plot(y ~ x)
abline(model)
Adding a wiggly line to a plot
plot(foo ~ bar)
lines(lowess(bar, foo))
For a few months I was a volunteer in the Simon Community, which deals with rough sleepers in London. There was a resident there who was a lot of trouble. He was very shrewd and insightful, and he could be extremely aggressive. Anyway, if he thought he was being messed around somehow , he would look straight at you and say: "I'm not a prick."
Brussels tried to get the European electorate to vote for a long, turgid, incomprehensible constitution - oops, sorry, constitutional treaty. (It was a constitution because everyone had to vote for it, but it was long and boring because it was a treaty. Got that?) If they didn't, the sky would fall in, there was no plan B, et cetera. To which the reply came: "I'm not a prick."
One more thing while I'm ranting. Various important Brussels people have been publicly puzzling, agonizing, over what the two No's can possibly "mean". Here's a clue: they mean No, you numbwits.