Mainstream opinion seems to be as
follows:
- Creating the Euro was a mistake.
- We should save the Euro at all costs.
“At all costs” means:
- In the short run, the ECB to buy member states' bonds, or to issue Eurobonds.
- In the long run, centralized budgetary discipline in the Eurozone...
- … and perhaps much greater transfers to provide “automatic stabilizers”
On the face of it (1) and (2) do not
sit well together. The argument for combining them is that the
alternative is disastrous: government default, one or more countries
leaving the Euro, bank runs which governments can no longer prevent,
and perhaps a second Great Depression.
Almost anything would be justified to
avoid a really serious depression, because events on that scale do
not just impose economic hardship – they also risk devolving into
political chaos. For instance, I have heard the Great Depression and
the collapse of world trade cited as a cause of World War Two, though
I don't know enough history to evaluate that claim.
On the other hand, the argument is not
completely obvious.
First, it isn't necessary to leave the
Euro in order to default. Greece, for example, is keen to stay in the
Euro. The cost of staying in the Euro is being stuck with an
uncompetitive exchange rate. But countries have survived that. By
defaulting they would at least rid themselves of the debt overhang
that is forcing them to cut, cut, cut government spending in the
midst of a recession. The cost of leaving the Euro is being stuck
with a less credible currency, and probably facing bank runs as a
result.
On the other hand, if countries do
leave the Euro, that may not be disastrous for them. (Or why would
they do it voluntarily?) Britain was forced to float its currency 20
years ago; the Conservative government was humiliated, but the
economic results were actually beneficial, weren't they? There is a
trade-off: chaos at exit versus increased competitiveness with your
own currency afterwards.
At the very least, the economic tail is
wagging the political dog. European government structures are being
created as a panicked response to a crisis. These structures are
likely to be less democratic, more centralized (with Germany being
the centre), and also to set in stone the Eurozone's problems, as
follows:
- There will still be a single currency without the integrated labour markets that would help it to work.
- There will still be the temptation to fiscal indiscipline, which will have to be prevented by centralized control.
Fans of democracy, freedom and
responsible politics should not find this an appealing prospect. It
would also be a national defeat for Britain, because we would be on
the periphery of a large centralized Eurozone with very different
economic interests and values to our own.
If the alternative is really a global
economic collapse then perhaps this is the best choice of a bad
bunch. My personal nightmare is different:
- Europe centralizes;
- Established parties, and elites more generally, face an ever-stronger backlash from their “angry and defrauded young”;
- A new generation of populists enters national governments. They offer fantasy solutions, play fast and loose with deficits, and fail to exercise mutual discipline at European level.
- We have a century of Argentina-style distributive politics, relative decline, and domination by a resurgent Russia.
My instinct is that failed ideas should
be discarded; but if we are going to have the Euro, it seems better
to have fiscal discipline and a hard budget constraint – a core
condition for “market-preserving federalism”. The US has achieved
this, so why can't Europe?
Perhaps I am missing something and
there's an obvious reason that a default means a Euro collapse, and
that Euro breakup must inevitably be an economic catastrophe.
Certainly lots of people think so. However, perhaps some of the
current panic comes from businessmen and bankers who naturally
confuse short-term harm to themselves with the end of civilization.
"... European government structures are being created as a panicked response to a crisis. These structures are likely to be less democratic, more centralized (with Germany being the centre), and also to set in stone the Eurozone's problems, as follows:
ReplyDelete--There will still be a single currency without the integrated labour markets that would help it to work.
--There will still be the temptation to fiscal indiscipline, which will have to be prevented by centralized control."
Why would these be "set in stone"? Greater EU (or eurozone) control of national budgets/deficits would surely tend toward greater integration of national economies, ie over time a more integrated labour market. And certainly they wouldn't set in stone the (current)temptation to excessive national-budget deficits and consequent borrowing; they would tend to deter these precisely because the governments concerned would know in advance that they risked being stamped on.
"Fans of democracy, freedom and responsible politics should not find this an appealing prospect. It would also be a national defeat for Britain, because we would be on the periphery of a large centralized Eurozone with very different economic interests and values to our own."
Agreed about what fans of democracy should feel. Disagreed about the eurozone having different economic interests--except that any nation's interests are its own, not other people's. Or different economic values; unless you think that extreme free-marketry is a British value, as it was to M.Thatcher, but surely not today even to her Tory sucessors.
Well, I think the question is how credible the "rules" will be. The last rules (the Stability Pact) weren't enforced when they applied to the strong. So, I can imagine Brussels demanding ex ante control over budgeting in Greece, and maybe punishing indiscipline ex post. I find it hard to imagine France tolerating the same.
ReplyDeleteAs for the integrated labour market... over time, that may happen, but it hasn't happened yet, and there are big obstacles in its path: language, national labour regulations....